

11 September 1959

Brig. Gen. R. E. Cashman, Jr.
Assistant to the Vice President

Attached are two copies of a
special memorandum containing
"Harsh Khrushchev Statements,
on U. S. Government Policy, The
President, and Secretary Dulles."

/s/


Executive Officer

STAT

O/DCI/JSE/ji

1 - JSE—

1 - ER

270347

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002700070072-9

Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002700070072-9

HARSH KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENTS

ON U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY, THE PRESIDENT, AND SECRETARY DULLES

This collation reproduces examples of Khrushchev's most critical remarks about the President and Secretary Dulles (Part A) and a selection of statements in which Khrushchev attacked U.S. Government policies (Part B). All the statements quoted were publicized by Radio Moscow or TASS.

Background on Soviet Propaganda Treatment of the President and Secretary Dulles

Moscow's general propaganda practice has been to steer clear of direct personal abuse of the President--to attack Presidential pronouncements without criticizing the President himself, to put major blame on Secretary Dulles for "aggressive" U.S. policies while he was in office, and occasionally even to portray the President and Dulles as holding conflicting views.

Khrushchev departed from Soviet propaganda's sometimes cordial and almost always circumspect treatment of President Eisenhower in his 19 September 1958 letter to the President (page A1 of this collation), saying that prior Soviet "good feelings" toward Eisenhower had been "largely undermined." At variance with the usual practice of exempting the President from harsh attacks directed at Secretary Dulles, the letter said the USSR deemed "Mr. Dulles' brink-of-war policy" to be "inseparable" from the President's name.

Radio Moscow's follow-up comment on the letter sharpened Khrushchev's criticism of the President. A commentary by Viktorov on 20 September 1958 (widely broadcast to foreign--including Chinese and European satellite--audiences) asserted that "Dulles' brink-of-war policy, a policy openly supported by President Eisenhower, breaks all records for hypocrisy." And a 23 September 1958 SOVIET RUSSIA article, read in Moscow's home service, claimed U.S. press reports that Dulles had inspired the American rejection of Khrushchev's letter were part of a "clumsy effort to preserve the honor of the President's uniform."

Such attacks on the President dropped out of the propaganda after September. Moscow reverted to its previous hands-off practice as regards Eisenhower personally and has sustained this practice throughout the past year.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Earlier Background: Moscow's harshest criticism of the President prior to September 1958 was also made by Khrushchev--in his December 1955 Supreme Soviet speech attacking the President's Christmas messages to the East European peoples (page A1 of this collation). But Khrushchev tempered the attack by remarking he disliked having to say such things because "I especially respect" Mr. Eisenhower. Subsequent Moscow comment toned down Khrushchev's remarks about the Christmas messages: Although broadcasts assailed the "gross interference" in the internal affairs of the "People's Democracies," they abstained from attacks on the President.

Moscow did subject General Eisenhower to severe personal abuse for his 25 August 1952 address to the American Legion Convention--after his nomination as the Republican candidate for the Presidency. A PRAVDA editorial--broadcast by Moscow some 60 times--drew a parallel between Eisenhower and the late Secretary Forrestal. In phraseology unusual for a PRAVDA editorial even in the Stalin period, it urged the General to "swallow some cold water, Ike; it will bring you back to your senses." Excerpts from the editorial are reproduced at the end of Part A of this collation.

Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002700070072-9

A. ON PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND SECRETARY DULLES

After your election as President of the United States of America, Soviet statesmen pinned great hopes upon you. Remembering the experience of fine cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States at the time you were the commander in chief of the armed forces of the United States, Britain, and France in the war against fascism, against Hitler Germany, we hoped that this cooperation would also be possible after the war--in the present period, in the interest of preserving and consolidating peace. However, the policy you are now pursuing as President has largely undermined these good feelings and to an ever greater degree strengthens our belief that the brink-of-war policy of Mr. Dulles in fact is inseparable from your name, is associated with it. This is highly regrettable. (19 September 1958 letter to the President on the Taiwan Strait situation)

In this connection particular mention should be made of the position taken now by certain prominent U.S. leaders, including President Eisenhower who, as is known, spoke no little in Geneva about the need to ease international tension.

I have in mind specifically the so-called Christmas messages of President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, and other important American leaders to the peoples in the countries of People's Democracy, messages which in no way tally with the Geneva spirit and are nothing else but rude interference in the domestic affairs of free and sovereign states--members of the United Nations. In their "Christmas messages" the American leaders declared that they "are praying" for a change in the system of those countries and they openly promise U.S. "support" in this matter.

Is this evidence of a desire for conciliation or a striving to reinforce and spread the spirit of Geneva? No, this has the opposite effect, this leads to the fanning of passions and consequently to a new arms drive and greater war danger. I very much dislike to speak about all this, and particularly about Mr. Eisenhower, whom I especially respect. It may be said that Khrushchev, speaking about these questions, wants to do away with the Geneva spirit.

But I am not putting forth these questions. I am merely replying to those who, violating the Geneva spirit, closely interfere in the domestic affairs of our allies and friends, the People's Democracies. (29 December 1955 Supreme Soviet speech)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002700070072-9

The ruling circles of the United States are virtually pushing Turkey against Syria. Turkey is concentrating her forces at the Syrian frontier. She is even laying bare certain parts of her frontier with the Soviet Union, but she should certainly not be doing this.

If you really have somebody in the Senate who is close to Eisenhower then why do you not convey through him to President Eisenhower that he should implement his noble aspirations and stop, on the strength of his authority, the criminal hand raised over the world, which is ready to plunge the world into a new slaughter. But Eisenhower must know all this because Dulles can do nothing without the President's consent. Possibly, Mr. Eisenhower does sincerely want to come to an agreement with us. But in a number of cases he tries to deal with us as with his satellites who are ready to obey him in everything. But one cannot deal with us that way. The interests of our country and the interest of peace must be taken into account. (7 October 1957 interview with James Reston of the New York TIMES)

We communists, the Soviet politicians, are atheists. But we place high value on our pledges, on our word, and we never break our pledges. We value the life of man and devote all our efforts to insuring that the people of our country have a good, happy life, that all Soviet people are equal in their rights and duties, that they have all the possibilities for enjoying the fruits of their labor. We communists are fighting actively to prevent war, are doing everything that there be no new war.

Now, take Mr. Dulles, for instance. He is a religious man and very often he appeals to God, calling upon him as witness. So, appealing to God, Mr. Dulles sends his emissary, Mr. Henderson, to Turkey and other countries to engineer war, to organize the killing of people. (22 November 1957 interview with Hearst and other INS correspondents)

I would like to say a few words in connection with Mr. Eisenhower's claims that it is difficult to agree with the Soviet Government, because it consists of atheists and godless people, while Western governments are governed by morality based on religion. How, he says, can we have talks with a government if it is not ruled by a God-willed morality? Mr. Eisenhower claims that "the future belongs not to the idea of a regimented godless state, but to God-fearing and peace-loving people throughout the world."

Mr. President seems somehow to want to compromise us in public opinion and wants to stress that one cannot agree with Soviet leaders because they do not believe in God. He seems to say that a

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

government which believes in God does good. Mr. Eisenhower himself knows well enough that this is not true. ***

Maybe Mr. President will recall that people professing their piety did everything to remove and expel from Guatemala a government unsuitable to them and an undesirable president, organizing an intervention for the sake of the profits of a handful of monopolists. All this was also done in the name of strengthening faith in the Lord. (22 January 1958 speech in Minsk)

The following are excerpts from a 29 August 1952 PRAVDA editorial dealing with Eisenhower's 25 August 1952 speech to the American Legion on foreign policy. The PRAVDA editorial was broadcast 60 times by Radio Moscow.

What prompted Eisenhower's hysterical speech? He supplied the answer himself when he delved into the question of fear. He drew for his audience a fantastic picture of imaginary Soviet aggression that came out of his own delirious mind. He sought to scare his listeners by telling them that the United States is now in greater danger than at any other time in its history. We do not think that Eisenhower has already reached the condition of the late secretary James Forrestal, but he is certainly very skillful in imitating Forrestal just before he jumped out of the window of a lunatic asylum. ***

...Everytime this American strategist declares with pomp what "we must tell the Soviets with cold finality," one feels like giving him a bit of advice. Swallow some cold water, Ike; it will bring you back to your senses. You are not coolheaded. You are having a fit of blustering hysteria. ***

...It is said that a policy based on threats and intimidations is the weapon of the weak against those who are easily frightened. So let General Eisenhower go on scaring the crows in his backyard if he is so addicted to the policy of intimidation.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

B. ON U.S. POLICIES

On the President's "Open-Skies" Plan

In 1955 President Eisenhower made a proposal about flights over the entire territory of our country for the purpose of photographing everything on it, for wide-scale reconnaissance. What other purpose can there be in flying than reconnaissance? By the way, the President himself did not deny this. At that time we declared outright that, as long as there was mistrust between our countries, the Soviet Union could not accept such proposals. But we pointed out that on the whole, we did not exclude the possibility of such flights when friendly relations were established between all countries, when we can see that nobody threatens us. Then no such importance will be attached to such flights. You can fly, walk, or travel where you like. (24 February 1959 preelection speech in Moscow)

On Nuclear Testing

This is yet another proof that the Western powers do not desire a positive solution of the problem of the discontinuation of tests. The Western powers will gain nothing by continuing to insist in the future on the adoption of their proposals which are aimed at achieving unilateral advantages. We shall never agree to it.

The Western public should not be deceived. It should be told frankly that the governments of these powers do not wish to conclude an agreement on the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests and that they wish, as before, to explode nuclear bombs. Well then, we shall regret it, but we shall be compelled to do the same in the interests of our own security until a wise settlement is found. (24 February 1959 preelection speech in Moscow)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

On Disarmament

One sometimes gets the impression that some of your statesmen simply do not want to reach any agreement with the Soviet Union. At times they talk of achievements in the disarmament talks but such achievements do not exist. However, I think that President Eisenhower and Mr. Stassen want to find a road to agreement, but in your country there are forces which are opposed to this. For example, it appears to us, that your Secretary of State does not want what Mr. Eisenhower is working for. (7 October 1957 interview with James Reston of the New York TIMES)

On Taiwan

While admitting in your reply that a dangerous situation has developed in the Taiwan area, you are at the same time seeking to absolve the U.S. Government of the responsibility for the tension in that area which is threatening peace. Moreover, to whitewash the aggressive actions of the United States, your message utterly distorts the actual state of affairs and draws a picture which has nothing in common with the realities.

Whoever takes a sober view of the existing situation, basing oneself on the real facts, is bound to admit that the only true source of tension in that part of the world resides in the fact that the United States has seized inalienable Chinese territory--Taiwan and a number of other islands--keeps under the protection of its guns the Chiang Kai-shek clique, thrown out by the Chinese people, and encourages its sallies and provocations against People's China. The recent events are some of the manifestations of this general aggressive policy of the United States with respect to China. (19 September 1958 letter to the President on the Taiwan Strait situation)

On a Summit Meeting

Comrades, over three months have elapsed since the Soviet Government put forward its proposal for the convening of a conference of the leaders of the states, with the participation of the heads of government, to solve a number of urgent problems and to determine by joint effort effective ways of lessening international tension and of ending the state of cold war. However, we are told that the situation in the East European countries should be discussed.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

What do they want to discuss? Who has given anyone the right to discuss the question of the internal development of other countries?

Nothing doing, my good gentlemen, do not poke your noses into somebody else's garden! The people of East Europe have already solved this problem. They are the masters of their own household. They will not allow anyone to interfere in their internal affairs.
(4 April 1958 speech in Budapest)

On East Europe

The very fact indeed that the message of the U.S. President [15 February 1958 letter to Bulganin] contained the so-called issue of the position in the countries of East Europe is unheard of in relations among states. Think of it, how can a state entertaining normal diplomatic relations with other countries, having in them its diplomatic representatives--and these countries have their embassies in Washington and are members of the United Nations--how can such a state advance the question of the political system of these countries to a third party? Has anyone empowered this state to act in this way? If such a full power does exist, may it present it. This is really a gross violation of elementary norms in relations among states.

We have repeatedly and resolutely stated that we are not going to discuss this issue--not because we are so intractable as W stern countries wish to present us, not because we allegedly reject categorically the proposals of the United States. No, the very raising of this question is insulting to those countries whom the U.S. President has in view and runs counter to common sense.
(14 March 1958 preelection speech in Moscow)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY